istanbul commitments

The Istanbul Commitments

In EDM, Vladimir Socor discusses the Russian government's maneuverings

in connection with a secret conference which, with the connivance of

"Old" Europe, among other things threatens the security of the Baltic

states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Certainly an issue to watch

over the coming months. Socor writes:

Amid a deep secrecy that belies its democratic professions, the

OSCE is preparing to hold a Conference to Review the Operation of

the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna at the

end of this month. Some West European chancelleries are seeking

ways to give in to Moscow's main goal at this conference:

ratification of the 1999 treaty at the expense of a few small

countries in Europe's East. Thus far, Moscow has only managed to

persuade Belarus, Ukraine (during Leonid Kuchma's presidency), and

Kazakhstan to ratify that treaty.

Originally signed in 1990, the CFE Treaty underwent adaptation at

the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit, in one package with the Final Act

that includes what came to be known as Russia's "Istanbul

Commitments"; namely, to withdraw its forces from Georgia and

Moldova. While the original 1990 treaty remains in force, the

1999-adapted treaty never entered into force because Russia has not

fulfilled those commitments. Moreover, Armenian forces deploy

Russian-supplied heavy weaponry exceeding CFE treaty limits in

areas seized from Azerbaijan, out of bounds to international

inspection.

Meanwhile, Russia seeks to extend the CFE Treaty's area of

applicability so as to include the three Baltic states, which were

not parties to the 1990 treaty (they were still occupied by Moscow

at that time). Since the Baltic states joined NATO, Russia seeks to

bring them under the purview of the 1999-adapted CFE treaty and

start negotiations with them about limiting allied forces that

might hypothetically be deployed to the Baltic states' territories,

for example in crisis contingencies. Legally, however, the Baltic

states cannot join an unratified treaty.

Thus, Russia is now pressing for the treaty's speedy ratification

by all state-parties, so as to make possible the Baltic states'

accession to the ratified treaty, while still keeping Russian

troops on Georgia's and Moldova's territories in Abkhazia, South

Ossetia, and Transnistria. Moscow calculates that Western consent

to ratification of the 1999 treaty in such circumstances would

legitimize, prolong, and even legalize the stationing of Russian

troops in Georgia and Moldova as "peacekeepers."

To pave the way for such an outcome, Moscow has agreed with Georgia

to close Russian bases and military installations situated deep

inside the country by 2008 (nine years after its pledge to do so);

but it insists on maintaining its "peacekeeping" forces in Abkhazia

and South Ossetia while heavily arming its proxy forces there.

Russia had liquidated most of its treaty-limited weaponry in

Transnistria already in 2001; but retains a part of it to this day,

has transferred another part as well as personnel to

Transnistria-flagged forces, and openly repudiates the obligation

to withdraw Russia's own troops, styled as "peacekeepers."

The United States as well as NATO collectively take the position

that ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty is inseparably linked

to fulfillment of Russia's commitments to withdraw its forces from

Georgia and Moldova; and that the Baltic states would accede to the

treaty, once it enters into force.

Russia has drafted its version of a decision for the CFE Treaty

Review conference and wants negotiations on its basis in the OSCE's

Joint Consultative Group (JCG), the Vienna forum of the 30

state-parties to the treaty. Moscow's draft claims, "Most

commitments and arrangements mentioned in the [1999] Final Act are

either already fulfilled or are in the process of fulfillment,

[while] the implementation of the remaining ones has no direct

relevance to the CFE Treaty and depends on the progress of conflict

settlement on the territories of some State Parties." It proposes

that all state parties should deem the 1999 treaty as valid from

October 2006, start the national ratification procedures, bring the

treaty into force in 2007, and "discuss the possibility of

accession of new participants."

The translation: Although Russia has far from completely honored

its force-withdrawal commitments, the state-parties (mostly NATO

and European Union member countries) should agree that it has.

Thus, they should: proceed with the Moscow-desired ratification of

the treaty; de-link ratification from the fulfillment of Russia's

withdrawal commitments, using the conflicts for an excuse; lean on

Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan to accept the situation and ratify

the treaty; and start the procedure of the Baltic states' accession

to the force-limiting treaty.

Some German, French, Belgian, and other diplomats are now exploring

a solution that could allow Russia to claim that it has fulfilled

its troop-withdrawal commitments. Such a solution would:

1) exempt Russia's "peacekeeping" troops from the obligation to

withdraw, recognizing their hitherto unrecognized role as

"peacekeepers" and allowing them to stay on;

2) silently tolerate the arsenals of CFE treaty-limited weaponry

that Russia has transferred to proxy forces in Transnistria,

Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, as well as the deployments inside

Azerbaijan; and

3) elicit consent from Tbilisi, Chisinau, and Baku with such a

solution.

It would seem that the secrecy surrounding the JCG debates in

Vienna and the ironing out of common positions at the EU in

Brussels is a propitious atmosphere for a compromise with Moscow at

the expense of small countries. Lack of transparency in Vienna also

tends to facilitate undercutting or diluting the U.S. and